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By all accounts, 1890 in the U.K. was not an exceptional year. Queen Victoria was in the last decade of her nearly 64-year reign 
as monarch. The Prince of Wales, the future King 
Edward VII, continued to be a cause for concern 
and embarrassment by becoming embroiled in the 
“royal baccarat scandal,” in which he was forced to 
give evidence in court the following year when one 
of the participants in the illegal card game unsuc-
cessfully sued one of his fellow players after being 
accused of cheating.2 
 In the courts, William Brett, first Viscount 
Esher, was the Master of the Rolls. A conservative 
politician, he was the solicitor-general under Prime 
Minister Benjamin Disraeli. He became a judge in 
1868 and went on to hear many important and often-
cited cases, probably the most important of which 
was Foakes v. Beer3 on the concept of consideration 
in contracts. Yet rarely, if ever, will you find a men-
tion in biographical references to him of a case that 
is of considerable importance in the modern era 
of international restructurings and insolvencies: 
Antony Gibbs & Sons v. La Société Industrielle et 
Commerciale des Métaux.4
 The Gibbs Rule can trace its roots to even older 
cases.5 It is authority for the proposition that a debt 
governed by English law cannot be discharged or 
compromised by foreign insolvency proceedings. In 
Lord Esher’s own words, “Why should the plaintiffs 
be bound by the law of a country to which they do 
not belong, and by which they have not contracted 
to be bound?”
 As international cases have become increasing-
ly prominent, many writers have thought that the 
Gibbs Rule is out of step with the modern world. 
Indeed, one commentator6 said that the “Gibbs doc-
trine belongs to an age of Anglocentric reasoning 
[that] should be confined to history.”
 The Gibbs Rule does not apply where the credi-
tor submits to the foreign insolvency proceeding.7 
This makes perfect sense, because the creditor will 
be regarded as having consented to the law of the 
foreign proceeding determining its entitlements. 
However, the degree of engagement with the for-
eign proceedings in the Gibbs case was extensive. 
 Antony Gibbs entered a proof of debt in the for-
eign proceedings (albeit that it expressly reserved 
all of Gibbs’ rights with regard to the action in the 
English court that was then pending) and com-
menced an action in the French court in relation to 
the liquidators’ determination of it. This is men-
tioned for reasons that will become apparent later, 
but also to point out that in modern times, Gibbs 
may well have been taken to have acceded to the 
foreign proceeding with all that entails.8
 Now, let’s come back to the present. In January 
2018, the English High Court heard the case of 
Bakhshiyeva v. Sberbank of Russia, also known 
as OJSC International Bank of Azerbaijan.9 Hon. 
Robert Hildyard began his judgment by succinct-
ly setting out the issue before him: “[T] he tension 
between what is often referred to as the [Gibbs 
Rule] and, in the context of a foreign insolvency 
proceeding which has been recognised in this juris-
diction, the principle of ‘modified universalism.’”
 In this case, the foreign representative of the 
Bank of Azerbaijan applied for a permanent10 stay 
of enforcement to prevent a creditor from exercising 
its rights under a contract governed by English law in 
order to prevent that creditor from enforcing its rights 
contrary to the terms of the foreign insolvency pro-
ceeding by which all creditors were bound in accor-
dance with the foreign law. The foreign proceedings 
had already been recognized under the Cross-Border 
Insolvency Regulations 2006 (CBIR).11 The creditors 
argued, in terms, that this would prevent them from 
exercising their English law rights and thus went 
beyond the available relief in the CBIR. 
 In a very thorough and lengthy written judgment, 
Mr. Justice Hildyard, following the Gibbs Rule and 
the decision in Fibre Celulose SA v. Pan Ocean Co 
Ltd.,12 concluded that the purpose of CBIR is not 
to enable the English Court to vary or discharge 
substantive English law rights and, more generally, 
that the court could not import other countries’ laws 
without more (e.g., in the form of some statutory 
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remit or higher authority).13 In the latter regard, he took note 
of the Supreme Court’s approach to the English Courts’ juris-
diction in such matters in Rubin v. Eurofinance SA.14 The 
crux of the matter was that Mr. Justice Hildyard did not feel 
that he could displace the Gibbs Rule in favor of the prin-
ciples of modified universalism as expressed in the English 
common law and transmitted through the Model Law, which 
is reflected in CBIR. 
 In contrast, it is probably fair to say that, in general 
terms, U.S. courts have been more prepared to embrace 
modified universalism as espoused in the Model Law than 
English courts.15 The U.S. has had a long tradition of recog-
nizing restructurings of foreign companies where the under-
pinning financial instruments are governed by U.S. law. This 
can be traced back as far as the Supreme Court’s 1883 deci-
sion in the Gebhard case,16 where Chief Justice Morrison 
Waite, while approving the recognition of a Canadian 
Scheme of Arrangement, said that “the true spirit of interna-
tional comity requires that schemes of this character, legal-
ized at home, should be recognised in other countries.” This 
set forth a belief and acceptance that for restructurings and 
reorganizations to be effective, they have to have binding 
extraterritorial effect. 
 However, a recent case before in the Southern District 
of New York seemed to turn against the tide of U.S. think-
ing in these matters. In In re SunEdison,17 Hon. Stuart M. 
Bernstein declined to grant comity to Korean insolvency 
law, instead citing the Pan Ocean case ratio, saying that “the 
parties selected New York Law to govern their contractual 
rights, and the application of Korean law ignores that choice 
and their presumed expectations.”
 The case concerned a chapter 15 application of a 
SunEdison joint-venture entity called SMP Ltd., which oper-
ated a plant in Korea. The joint-venture agreement between 
the parties contained an ipso facto clause entitling either 
party to terminate the agreement if the other filed for bank-
ruptcy. The agreement was governed by New York law. 
 SunEdison and its affiliates filed for bankruptcy in New 
York, and SMP then filed a Korean rehabilitation proceeding. 
In the U.S. proceedings, the SunEdison group sold its assets, 
including its interest in the SMP joint venture, to a third 
party. SMP objected to the sale, but under a settlement agree-
ment approved in the U.S. and Korea, SunEdison agreed to 
pay $5 million to SMP. The settlement agreement required 
SunEdison to give notice to SMP regarding the termination 
of the joint-venture agreement, but gave SMP a right to chal-
lenge the validity of the termination through arbitration or in 
the U.S. courts. 
 SMP chose to challenge the termination by commenc-
ing a chapter 15 proceeding and obtained recognition of 
the Korean rehabilitation proceeding, then sought an order 
declaring the ipso facto clause unenforceable as a matter of 
Korean law. SunEdison took the successful position that New 
York state law applied to the joint-venture agreement and 
ipso facto clauses are enforceable in the absence of fraud, 
collusion or overreaching.
 While this is an interesting decision, it might not be 
more than a “fly in the ointment.” It is undoubtedly a case 
in which, had SMP been a chapter 11 case, the Bankruptcy 
Code would have trumped New York state law and rendered 
the SunEdison ipso facto clause unenforceable. Furthermore, 
the decision could have been different had the Korean court 
declared the ipso facto clause unenforceable or if the effects 
of a different decision had not adversely impacted the 
SunEdison sale, which had already been completed. 
 What conclusions can be reached? The Bank of 
Azerbaijan case is in the process of being appealed, with 
the appeal apparently being heard sometime in October 
in the court of appeal. The general proposition is that 
the court of appeal is bound by its own decisions in civil 
cases, but there are exceptions. As the Gibbs Rule is a 
court of appeal decision, at its simplest the court of appeal 
in Bank of Azerbaijan should uphold it. Over the years, 
however, under various masters of the rolls, not the least 
of which was Lord Denning, the court of appeal has often 
found ways around established legal precedent. Whatever 
the outcome, it must be likely that the case will go forward 
to the Supreme Court. 
 We should perhaps not be too hasty to cast the Gibbs 
Rule into the dustbin of history. In an era that could be 
characterised by increased protectionism and nationalism 
(“America First” and “Brexit”), it will undoubtedly be of 
importance in order to ensure that financial instruments 
continue to be written under English law and New York 
state law if London and New York are to maintain their 
positions as the preeminent forums and jurisdictions for 
cross-border restructurings. Maintaining the territorialist 
proposition that only the countries of origin can discharge 
debts could turn out to be an important focus for profession-
als on both sides of the pond. 
 The other side of that coin is the prospective effect 
on English schemes of arrangement that depend on being 
enforced in other jurisdictions and that continue to enjoy the 
blessing of U.S. courts, even where they contain nondebtor 
releases that would not necessarily pass muster in domestic 
chapter 11 proceedings.18 Modified universalism still seems 
to be where “it’s at,” in that there does not appear to be any 
viable new or revolutionary thinking to usurp it. There have 
been articles written about the deficiencies seen in the Model 
Law and its overly ecumenical approach to recognition, 
which pumps air into the fire of territorialism. 
 If we are truly to embrace modified universalism on the 
widest possible basis, we are going to need harder forms of 
law backed by political consensus, together with internation-
ally agreed-upon choice-of-law principles along the lines of 
what is currently in place in the European Union. Moving 
away from automatic recognition will undoubtedly give the 
judges more comfort, but there has to be concerted political 
enthusiasm. It cannot be left to the law and the professionals 
who work in the sector.  abi
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